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RICO: LIMITING SUITS BY ALTERING THE PATTERN
When Congress enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act,1 it sought "the eradication of organized crime in
the United States"2 by providing prosecutors with criminal penal-
ties and civil remedies with which to combat those involved in
racketeering activity.3 Commentators have ranged in their opinions
from those who have heralded the statute as an innovative new
tool enabling prosecutors to "even the odds" with organized
crime,4 to those who have disdainfully compared it to the "notori-
ous Article 58 in the Soviet Criminal Code."'5 Additionally, the
statute allows private litigants injured by racketeering activity to
bring suit for recovery of treble damages and attorney's fees.6 In
the last five years,7 this Civil RICO provision has become "every-
body's darling."'
RICO attacks this connection between organized crime and legit-
imate enterprise by prohibiting four activities. First, income re-
ceived from a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of an
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982). RICO was Title XI of the Organized Crime Control
Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
2. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922-23 (1970) (Statement of Findings and Purpose).
3. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963, 1964(a), (b) (1982).
4. Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic
Concepts - Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TaImP. L.Q. 1009, 1048 (1980). Professor Blakey
was Chief Counsel of the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures in 1969-
70 when the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 was passed. Mr. Gettings was Counsel
and Director of the House Republican Conference Task Force on Crime from 1967-69 as
Congress was developing the Act.
5. Berg & Zelikow, The Rico Statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968: The Business Client As
Racketeer, 45 Tax. B.J. 159, 164 (1982) (quoting 1 A. SOLZHENrrsYN, THE GULAG ARCHIPEL-
AGO (1973)).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) states, "Any person injured in his business or property by reason
of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United
States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the
suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
7. Only three percent of the approximately 270 trial court decisions addressing Civil
RICO reported through April 1985 were decided before 1980. REP. OF THE A Hoc CivL
RICO TASK FORCE OF THE ABA SEC. OF CORP., BANK. & Bus. LAW 55 (1985) [hereinafter cited
as ABA TASK FORCE].
8. Strafer, Massumi, & Skolnick, Civil RICO in the Public Interest: "Everybody's Dar-
ling", 19 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 655 (1982).
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unlawful debt may not be invested in an enterprise which is in-
volved in interstate commerce.9 Second, such a pattern or collec-
tion may not be used to acquire or maintain any interest in an
interstate enterprise.10 Third, such a pattern or collection may not
be used to conduct the affairs of such an enterprise." Finally, con-
spiracy to engage in any of these activities also violates the
statute.
12
To ensure the statute's effectiveness, Congress construed these
provisions and defined their key terms broadly and required that
they be liberally interpreted." Congress also enacted a "private at-
torney general" provision permitting civil suits by private liti-
gants.14 Provisions of this kind are "in part designed to fill
prosecutorial gaps."' 5 This section of the statute is responsible for
most of the current concern over RICO. Congress believed that
prosecutorial discretion would prevent abuse of the statute's broad
enforcement provisions.' 6 This expectation has been realized to
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) states in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, di-
rectly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collec-
tion of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal
within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest,
directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income,
in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any en-
terprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or for-
eign commerce.
10. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) states, "It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of
racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, di-
rectly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce."
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enter-
prise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign com-
merce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of
unlawful debt.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) states, "It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate
any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section."
13. Congress stated that "the provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to effec-
tuate its remedial purposes." Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947 (1970).
14. See supra note 6.
15. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3284 (1985).
16. See Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings on S.30, S.974, S.975, et.al.,
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 346-47, 424 (1969).
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some extent.17 The same restraint, however, is not apparent among
private litigants:
In the context of civil RICO... the restraining influence of pros-
ecutors is completely absent. Unlike the Government, private
litigants have no reason to avoid displacing state common-law
remedies. Quite to the contrary, such litigants, lured by the
prospect of treble damages and attorney's fees, have a strong in-
centive to invoke RICO's provisions. .... 18
Although Civil RICO suits were rare in the first ten years follow-
ing the statute's enactment, since 1980 courts have witnessed an
explosion of Civil RICO proceedings.1 9 As the number of Civil
RICO suits increased, courts tried to limit private litigants' use of
the statute. The earliest judicially imposed restriction on Civil
RICO was the requirement that the plaintiff prove a nexus be-
tween the defendant and organized crime.20 The courts soon disre-
garded this requirement as lacking a sufficient grounding in the
statute.2' In recent years, courts attempted to limit Civil RICO by
allowing plaintiffs to bring suits only against defendants with a
17. See, e.g., United States Attorney's Manual, § 9-110.200 (1983) ("[I]t is the policy of
the Criminal Division that RICO be selectively and uniformly used. It is the purpose of
these guidelines to make it clear that not every case in which technically the elements of a
RICO violation exist, will result in the approval of a RICO charge.").
18. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3294 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
19. See supra note 7; see also Blakey & Gettings, supra note 4. At least one court has
given the Blakey & Gettings article credit for the sudden awareness in recent years of
RICO's potential. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, Co., 714 F.2d 483, 486 (2d Cir. 1984),
rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
20. The organized crime limitation was used first in Barr v. WUItrAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), where the court dismissed the RICO claim, noting that "[t]here is nothing
in the proposed complaint even to suggest that defendant is connected in any way with
organized crime." Id. at 113. Several courts followed this rule. See, e.g., Moss v. Morgan
Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 21 (2d Cir. 1983) (expressly rejecting the lower court's organized
crime nexus requirement); Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 527 F. Supp.
256, 260 (E.D. La. 1981); Adair v. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736, 746-48
(N.D. Ill. 1981).
21. According to Moran, Pleading a Civil RICO Action Under Section 1962(c): Conflict-
ing Precedent and the Practitioner's Dilemma, 57 TEMP. L.Q. 731, 747-48 (1984), courts
based their rejection of an organized crime nexus on three grounds. First, the plain language
of the statute does not support such an interpretation; second, the government does not
include an organized crime nexus as an element of a criminal RICO suit; finally, the burden
of proving a link between the defendant and organized crime would be too heavy for the
plaintiff or prosecutor and would result in the ineffectiveness of RICO. Moran cited Schacht
v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1353 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983), United States v.
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prior criminal conviction in the same matter22 or by requiring that
plaintiffs prove an indirect "racketeering" injury distinct from the
injury received from the predicate acts of racketeering.23 The vari-
ety of solutions offered to limit RICO's use by private plaintiffs
destined the issue for resolution in the Supreme Court.
In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,24 the Supreme Court by a 5-4
vote cast aside any judicially created limitations on Civil RICO. 25
Recognizing that Civil RICO was "evolving into something quite
different from the original conception of its enactors, '' 26 the Court
nevertheless decided that the job of correcting the statute lay with
Congress and not the Court. The Court pointed Congress in the
direction of reform, however, by asserting that the "extraordinary
uses to which civil RICO has been put appear to be primarily the
result of the breadth of the predicate offenses, in particular the
inclusion of wire, mail, and securities fraud, and the failure of Con-
gress and the courts to develop a meaningful concept of
'pattern'." 2 8
Uni Oil, Inc., 646 F.2d 946, 953 (5th Cir. 1981), and United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879,
885 (9th Cir. 1970), respectively, as support for these three grounds. Id. at 748 nn.77-79.
22. Almost every circuit rejected the prior conviction requirement. See, e.g., Bunker
Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272, 1286-87 (7th Cir. 1983); USACO
Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 95 n.1 (6th Cir. 1982). The Second Circuit's
treatment of Sedima provided the major support behind a prior conviction requirement. See
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 496-504 (1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
23. As with the prior conviction requirement, see supra note 22, the racketeering injury
requirement received consideration in most federal circuits but garnered little support. See,
e.g., Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1356-58 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983);
Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1058-59 (8th Cir. 1982).
24. 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
25. The Second Circuit had interpreted the term "violation" in § 1964(c) to mean that
the defendant in a Civil RICO suit must first be convicted of the predicate acts. Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 498-99 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985). The
Supreme Court rejected that interpretation: "As defined in the statute, racketeering activity
consists not of acts for which the defendant has been convicted, but of acts for which he
could be." Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3281.
The Court also perceived "no distinct 'racketeering injury' requirement." Id. at 3285. The
Court held that the harm caused by the predicate acts alone constitutes compensable injury
under RICO, and further found that the enactors of RICO viewed a racketeering injury
requirement, which would be similar to the competitive injury requirement in antitrust stat-
utes, as an unnecessary complication in administering the statute. Id. at 3285-86.
26. Id. at 3282.
27. Id.
28. Id.
ALTERING THE RICO PATTERN
This Note analyzes the purpose and role of the pattern require-
ment in Civil RICO, examines the problems courts have encoun-
tered in defining "pattern," and reviews proposals for reform of the
pattern requirement put forth by legal observers. The Note then
concludes that Congress should modify the pattern requirement,
and suggests modifications which will best provide guidelines by
which the courts consistently can determine when a pattern exists.
THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE PATTERN REQUIREMENT
Congress's concern over the impact of organized crime on legiti-
mate business grew as a result of several congressional investiga-
tions in the 1960's.29 RICO was the legislature's response to revela-
tions of the widespread presence of organized crime in legitimate
enterprise.3 0 The constitutional guarantee of prosecution for con-
duct only, and not for status,31 prevented Congress from simply
passing a statute outlawing membership in a suspected crime syn-
dicate. Congress had to design a law proscribing the specific con-
duct in which crime syndicates were engaged. Because the
lawmakers believed repeated acts of violence and intimidation
characterize professional criminal behavior, they created a "pat-
tern of racketeering activity" requirement as the centerpiece of the
statute.32
This desire to limit the application of RICO to the type of ongo-
ing criminal activity associated with professional criminals, how-
ever, conflicted with another congressional goal. Because of past
difficulty in successfully prosecuting organized crime figures, the
29. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SocmrY (1967); Hearings Before the Subcomm. of
the House Comm. on Appropriations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 271-78 (1966) (statement of J.
Edgar Hoover); Organized Crime and Illicit Traffic in Narcotics: Hearings Before the Per-
manent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations,
88th Cong., 1st Sess., 5-35 (1963) (statement of Robert F. Kennedy).
30. For a detailed history of the birth of RICO, see generally Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
Co., 741 F.2d 482, 488-94 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985); Blakey & Gettings,
supra note 4, at 1009-21; McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S.30) or Its Critics: Which
Threatens Civil Liberties?, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 55, 55-60 (1970).
31. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). But see Scales v. United States, 367
U.S. 203, 224-25 (1961).
32. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
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lawmakers desired to avoid legal loopholes by casting a wide net."3
The conflict inherent in designing a statute broad enough to catch
the true racketeer, but limited enough to prevent application
against the small-time criminal, underlies all the judicial disparity
in RICO's interpretation. The courts are caught between the broad
plain meaning of the statute, especially in light of the command
that RICO be "liberally construed," and the restrictive application
of the statute prescribed in the legislative history. Nowhere has
this conflict been clearer than in the judicial interpretation of the
"pattern" requirement.
Congress described "pattern" broadly as requiring "at least two
acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effec-
tive date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten
years-excluding any period of imprisonment-after the commis-
sion of a prior act of racketeering activity. '3 4 The breadth of this
definition ensured prosecutors ease in proving a pattern. This same
breadth, however, conflicts with congressional intent to reach only
true racketeers. Congress envisioned that the pattern requirement
would prevent RICO from being applied against the "isolated of-
fender."3 An oft-cited passage from the Senate report states that
the "target of [RICO] is. . .not sporadic activity. The infiltration
of legitimate business normally requires more than one 'racketeer-
ing activity' and the threat of continuing activity to be effective. "36
33. In the "Statement of Findings and Purpose" accompanying The Organized Crime
Control Act, Congress stated:
Organized crime continues to grow because of defects in the evidence-gathering
process of the law inhibiting the development of the legally admissible evi-
dence necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions or remedies to bear on
the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime and because the
sanctions and remedies available to the Government are unnecessarily limited
in scope and impact.
Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970). See also Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos., 727 F.2d
648, 654 (7th Cir. 1984) ("Congress deliberately cast the net of liability wide, being more
concerned to avoid opening loopholes through which the minions of organized crime might
crawl to freedom than to avoid making garden-variety frauds actionable in federal treble
damage proceedings-the price of eliminating all possible loopholes.").
34. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982).
35. 116 CONG. REc. 35,193 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff).
36. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969). The Supreme Court cited this pas-
sage in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3285 n.14 (1985), as well as in most
cases in which the court dealt with the pattern element. See, e.g., United States v. Moeller,
402 F. Supp. 49, 58 (D. Conn. 1975).
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Congress has left the courts out on a limb. If the courts interpret
"pattern" consistently with the facially broad meaning of section
1961(5), then all manner of individuals and organizations will find
themselves subject to RICO prosecution. The man who wins $1000
on two separate instances in a gambling game may face harsh
criminal and civil penalties. 3 On the other hand, if courts inter-
pret "pattern" narrowly, in line with the act's legislative history,
they may open up the loopholes for true organized crime which
Congress sought to close.
The term "pattern" defies concise definition. A standard diction-
ary defines "pattern" loosely as "a composite of traits or features
characteristic of an individual."388 The adaptability of "pattern"
makes it attractive for use in a criminal or civil statute; it provides
courts with the discretion necessary to adjudicate the many types
of alleged racketeering activity brought before the bench.
Because of the possibility for abuse of this discretion, however, a
pattern requirement must include guidelines by which courts can
render consistent interpretations. These guidelines should prevent
the use of the -statute in situations outside of the legislative intent,
while encouraging an interpretation of the statute by which that
intent will be fulfilled. The broad definition of pattern in section
1961(5) of RICO fails to provide this guidance. The result has been
confusion and inconsistency in the federal court system.
Until recently, very few Civil RICO litigants contested the valid-
ity of the pattern requirement.3 9 One commentator has suggested
that this may be a result of the emphasis in Civil RICO cases on
other limitations. 0 Criminal defendants, however, have challenged
the pattern requirement frequently. Their arguments generally
have centered around the assertion that "pattern" is unconstitu-
37. This example was asserted by Representatives Conyers, Mikva, and Ryan, who op-
posed Title XI of the Organized Crime Control Act. 116 CONG. REC. 34,870, 34,872 (1970).
38. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 962 (1981).
39. Prior to Sedima, the only reported Civil RICO case to fail because of the pattern
requirement was Teleprompter of Erie, Inc. v. City of Erie, 537 F. Supp. 6 (W.D. Pa. 1981)
(multiple bribes taken by public official all during the course of a one-night fundraiser).
40. Chepiga, Bookin & Khuzami, The "Pattern of Racketeering Activity" Requirement
After Sedima, 139 PRAc. LAW INST., CIVIL RICO 1985, 65, 77 [hereinafter cited as Pattern
After Sedima].
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tionally vague. Courts have rejected these challenges,41 but these
cases have provided courts with an opportunity to interpret the
pattern requirement.
The breadth of the definition of pattern in section 1961(5), and
the conflicting congressional desires to prosecute professional
criminals, but only professionals, have contributed to wide dispar-
ity in the judicial interpretation of this statutory element. The Su-
preme Court refused to clear up these inconsistencies in Sedima
even as it hinted at the need for an interpretation of "pattern."4
This Note offers a resolution of the various issues surrounding the
pattern requirement in a RICO proceeding.
THE RELATEDNESS ISSUE
Proponents of a Relatedness Element
A central issue in the interpretation of "pattern" as defined in
section 1961(5) is whether the defendant's acts must be interre-
lated. The earliest leading case that examined the relatedness ele-
ment as part of the pattern requirement was United States v.
Stofsky. 43 In that case, several garment manufacturing union offi-
cials faced charges of extortion, tax evasion, and violation of the
Taft-Hartley labor laws. On the basis of these activities, the gov-
ernment also brought a RICO charge.""
In an attempt to clarify the relationships between the RICO ele-
ments, the government asserted that the statute requires that the
racketeering offenses be "connected with each other by some com-
mon scheme, plan or motive so as to constitute a pattern and not
simply a series of disconnected acts.'"" Although the court found
no textual support for this position in the language of the statute,
it agreed that a pattern required "more than accidental or unre-
41. Despite the broad and somewhat ambiguous language of RICO, courts have rejected
vagueness challenges by relying on the specific nature of the predicate offenses. See, e.g.,
United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 440-42 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105
(1975); United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 527 F.2d 237
(2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976).
42. See supra text accompanying notes 24-28.
43. 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), af'd, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 819 (1976).
44. Id. at 611-12.
45. Id. at 613.
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lated instances of proscribed behavior. ' 46 To support this reading,
the court referred to a definition of pattern in another Title of the
Organized Crime Control Act, which states that "criminal conduct
forms a pattern if it embraces criminal acts that have the same or
similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of com-
mission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteris-
tics and are not isolated events. ' 47 Based on this provision, and on
the court's understanding of what Congress intended in incorpo-
rating pattern as an element of RICO, the court adopted the gov-
ernment's definition of pattern.48 The relatedness element thus re-
ceived its first strong judicial support.
Subsequent decisions followed the Stofsky opinion and recog-
nized the need for a relationship between the predicate offenses. In
United States v. White,49 the court stated that "[u]se of the term
'pattern' in connection with two racketeering acts committed by
the same person suggests that the two must have a greater interre-
lationship than simply commission by a common perpetrator." 50 In
the ensuing ten years, many courts adopted a reading of pattern
which included a relatedness element.51
The Supreme Court, which had remained silent on the proper
treatment of section 1961(5), finally commented in Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. 52 Justice White, writing for the Court, did
not provide an outright interpretation of pattern because that par-
ticular issue was not before the Court.53 In footnote 14, however,
Justice White wrote that "[t]he legislative history supports the
view that two isolated acts of racketeering activity do not consti-
tute a pattern. '54 He went on to note the possible use of the defini-
46. Id.
47. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1982).
48. 409 F. Supp. at 614.
49. 386 F. Supp. 882 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
50. Id. at 883.
51. See, e.g., United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208, 1222 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1206 (1983); United States v. Starnes, 644 F.2d 673, 678 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 826 (1981); United States v. Chovanec, 467 F. Supp. 41, 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); United
States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55, 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), afi'd mem., 578 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.
1978).
52. 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
53. Id. at 3287.
54. Id. at 3285 n.14.
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tion of pattern found in section 3575(e), just as the court in Stof-
sky had done.5
Although dicta, the language in Sedima indicates support for the
notion that "pattern" implies a relationship between the acts of
racketeering activity. Several federal courts have read Sedima in
this way.58 Further support for the relatedness element appears in
the recommendations of the American Bar Association. An ABA
Section on Criminal Justice Report stated that "[i]t is difficult to
discern any rationale for permitting two farflung and unrelated ac-
tivities to satisfy the pattern requirement merely because the same
business is involved, '57 and recommended a requirement that "the
acts be related in common scheme or plan."58
The report of the ABA Task Force on Civil RICO endorsed that
recommendation 59 and added that the "best guidance" for applica-
tion of the relatedness element is found in United States v.
Dean.60 In that case, the court relied on previous analysis in crimi-
nal conspiracy cases to determine whether several acts constituted
two distinct patterns of racketeering activity. Finding that "similar
factors [are] relevant in the RICO context," the court adopted a
five-point test.61 The ABA Task Force on Civil RICO approved of
this test which requires identifying: "(1) when each of the various
activities took place; (2) the identity of the persons involved in the
activities; (3) the statutory offenses charged as acts of racketeering;
(4) the nature and scope of the activities; and (5) the places where
the activities occurred."62
Other legal observers also have argued in favor of a relatedness
element,63 and a recent House bill included a "pattern" definition
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Miller v. Glen Helen Aircraft, Inc., 777 F.2d 496 (9th Cir. 1985); Alexander
Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Indus., 770 F.2d 717, 718 n.1 (8th Cir. 1985); Graham v. Slaughter,
624 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Allington v. Carpenter, 619 F. Supp. 474 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
57. 1982 A.B-. SEC. CRiM. JUST. REP. at 7 [hereinafter cited as ABA REPORT].
58. Id. at 6.
59. See ABA TASK FORCE, supra note 7, at 201.
60. 647 F.2d 779 (8th Cir. 1981).
61. Id. at 788.
62. ABA TASK FORCE, supra note 7, at 202 (paraphrasing the test used in Dean, 647 F.2d
at 788).
63. See, e.g., Bradley, Racketeers, Congress, and the Courts: An Analysis of RICO, 65
IOWA L. Rxv. 837, 862-65 (1980) ("[the relatedness element] seems a sensible approach that
is consistent with the congressional intent"); Wexler, Civil RICO Comes of Age: Some Mat-
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which would have required that the two acts be "interrelated by a
common scheme, plan or motive," and that they not be "isolated
events."64
Opponents of a Relatedness Element
Despite this strong support for a "pattern" definition which re-
quires a relationship between the predicate acts of the alleged pat-
tern, considerable opposition exists in the courts and among legal
observers.
Judicial resistance to a relatedness element can be traced to
United States v. Elliott.6 5 Elliott featured an unusual fact situa-
tion. Six defendants, some of whom had never met one another,
participated in a widespread ring of diverse criminal activities
ranging from murder to arson.6 No apparent relationship existed
between the acts other than the general reign of terror. The court,
however, explicitly rejected the holdings in Stofsky and White,
and found that "the statute does not require such interrelatedness,
and we can perceive no reason for reading it into the stathtory def-
inition .... "67
The holding in Elliott, although not as widely cited as that in
Stofsky, achieved a judicial following of its own. In United States
v. Weisman,68 the court conceded that Congress seemingly did not
intend RICO to apply to "sporadic and unrelated criminal acts."6
Nevertheless, the court found no relatedness element in the lan-
urational Problems and Proposals for Reform, 35 RUTGERs L. REv. 285, 338 (1983) (endors-
ing the relatedness proposals of the ABA REPORT, supra note 57); Note, The Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act: An Analysis of the Confusion in its Applica-
tion and a Proposal for Reform, 33 VAND. L. REV. 441, 477 (1980) (endorsing the relatedness
element of Stofsky, supra notes 43-48).
64. H.R. 2517, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (reprinted in part in Pattern After Sedima,
supra note 40, at 85-89). This bill encompassed most of the recommendations of the ABA
REPORT, supra note 57, and was one of several aimed at reforming RICO.
65. 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
66. Over a six-year period, various members of this loosely structured association burned
down a nursing home; counterfeited car titles; stole cars, construction equipment, and other
property; committed murder and physical ?ntimidation; and dealt in miscellaneous illegal
narcotics operations. Id. at 884-95.
67. Id. at 899 n.23.
68. 624 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980).
69. 624 F.2d at 1122.
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guage of the statute.70 The court also added a twist to the refer-
ence in Stofsky and other cases to section 3575(e) of the Organized
Crime Control Act by stating that Congress's failure to give section
1961(5) a similar definition reveals that Congress "intentionally
chose to use the term [pattern] differently" in RICO.7' Other
courts continued in this vein to find a pattern where no relation-
ship existed between the predicate acts. 2
In Sedima, the Supreme Court appeared to signal the end for
the Elliott-Weisman reading of "pattern. 73 The Court's refusal to
state a clear rule for interpreting the relatedness issue, however,
has led to a continued Elliott-Weisman reading in some cases. In
United States v. Qaoud, 4 for example, the court maintained that
"[t]here is no requirement . . . that the predicate acts be interre-
lated in any way. '7'5 Despite Sedima's footnote 14, therefore, the
doctrine dismissing a relatedness element is very much alive in the
federal court system. 6
Analysis
An analysis of the need for a relatedness element must take
place against the backdrop of the original purpose of RICO itself.
When Congress attempted to insulate legitimate enterprise from
the influence of organized crime, it did not concern itself with the
mere habitual criminal, but with the insidious influence of ongoing,
organized, criminal activity. Although, as some courts have noted,
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1122-23.
72. See, e.g., United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1011-12 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 906, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982).
73. See supra text accompanying notes 24-28.
74. 777 F.2d 1105 (6th Cir. 1985).
75. Id. at 1116.
76. See, e.g., United States v. Schnell, 775 F.2d 559, 569 (4th Cir. 1985); Torwest DBC,
Inc. v. Dick, 628 F. Supp. 163, 165-67 (D. Colo. 1986) (finding that the language of § 3575(e)
applies to the continuity element of pattern and that the predicate acts need be related only
to the enterprise, and not to each other). Some legal observers also continue to oppose a
relatedness element. Cf. Blakey & Gettings, supra note 4, at 1030 n.96 (asserting that "Elli-
ott, not Sto/sky, was decided correctly"). Some opposition is based on the concern that
reading a relatedness element into the pattern requirement, although perhaps desirable in a
civil context, will endanger the statute's availability as a mechanism for criminal law en-
forcement. Id; see also RICO: Hearings on H.R. 2577 and H.R. 2943 Before the Subcomm.
on Criminal Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1985).
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the relatedness element does not appear in the plain language of
the statute, the fulfillment of its original purpose requires that
courts consider the relationship between the statute's predicate
acts in any inquiry into whether a pattern exists.
Finding a relatedness element that courts can interpret consist-
ently, while also maintaining legislative intent, however, is difficult.
Each of the suggested alternatives1 7 has various ramifications for
RICO litigation; in particular, however, any relatedness element
must be considered in terms of its effect on the availability of ei-
ther Civil or Criminal RICO as a tool for law enforcement.
Legal observers and critics of RICO, for example, generally are
more concerned with the current explosion of Civil RICO cases
than with the use of Criminal RICO. During the 1970's, when pros-
ecutors were applying RICO almost exclusively to criminal cases,
public clamor for reform was understandably limited. No one
wanted to be responsible, after all, for limiting a tool which ena-
bled law enforcement officials to attack organized crime effectively.
In the last five years, however, the profusion of Civil RICO suits
against non-criminal defendants has caused an outcry in legal cir-
cles. In this decade, few legal issues have received as much atten-
tion. Under these circumstances, the relatedness element must be
measured in terms of its comparative impact on both Civil and
Criminal RICO.
The impact on Civil RICO will be minute. Civil litigants gener-
ally do not have standing to bring claims unless they have suffered
an injury. If the injury is the result of two or more acts of racke-
teering activity under section 1961(1),71 the plaintiff can probably
show the requisite relationship between the acts simply by proving
that the defendant directed both acts at the plaintiff. Two injuries
or fraudulent acts aimed at the same person almost certainly
77. The American Bar Association has proposed a requirement that the acts "be related
in common scheme or plan." ABA REPORT, supra note 57, at 6. A proposed amendment to
RICO would have required that the acts must be "interrelated by a common scheme, plan or
motive, and are not isolated events." H.R. 2517, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). Finally, the
Organized Crime Control Act defines a pattern thus: "criminal conduct forms a pattern if it
embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims
or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics
and are not isolated events." 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1982).
78. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982).
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should constitute a common scheme or plan. Similarly, under the
section 3575(e) definition, acts with the same "victims" form a pat-
tern.79 The majority of Civil RICO cases, therefore, will not be af-
fected by a relatedness element.
With regard to Criminal RICO, however, a relatedness element
would create "a whole new ballgame."80 Such a requirement would
severely cripple law enforcement officials in their assault on organ-
ized crime. Under the present reading, the prosecutor, unlike the
private Civil RICO litigant, has no standing requirement to satisfy.
The prosecutor can allege many widely varied activities with which
to build a case against criminal defendants. In United States v.
Elliott,"' for example, the defendants engaged in a broad reign of
terror involving numerous individual victims. None of those vic-
tims could presumably have satisfied the standing requirements to
institute a Civil RICO suit individually, but the criminal case was
allowed. The court held that "although the target of the RICO
statute is not 'sporadic activity', we find nothing in the Act exclud-
ing from its ambit an enterprise engaged in diversified activity. 8 2
Working within the confines of too-strict a relatedness element,
however, future prosecutors would face great difficulty in applying
RICO to an Elliott-type of fact situation. Surely, however, a group
of individuals participating in the kind of activities found in Elli-
ott fall within the realm of organized criminal activity at which
RICO is aimed.
A too-narrow interpretation of "common scheme or plan" or
''same or similar purposes," both suggested relatedness proposals,
could render RICO ineffective in the war against organized crime.
Prior to passage of the Organized Crime Control Act, the methodi-
cal actions of professional criminals often enabled them to escape
convictions. Given a narrow reading of "pattern" in RICO cases,
professional criminals might avoid RICO's sanctions by contriving
79. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1982).
80. Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare, N.A. v. Inryco, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 828, 833 (N.D. Ill.
1985) (referring to the effect of Sedima on interpretation of the pattern requirement).
81. 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
82. Id. at 899. The court went on to state: "We would deny society the protection in-
tended by Congress were we to hold that the Act does not reach those enterprises nefarious
enough to diversify their criminal activity." Id.
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that their acts appear unrelated.83 Courts and prosecutors should
not have their hands tied by prior strict readings of the relatedness
element.
Another consideration involved in the discussion of a relatedness
element is its effect on the defendant's procedural rights. Rather
than extending protection to the alleged offender, a too-strict re-
latedness element may place him in a worse position. In theory at
least, courts currently examining the pattern requirement can em-
ploy practical experience. Juries can press into service their own
ideas of what forms a pattern. Defendants can argue the underly-
ing concepts of "pattern" before the court.. While these factors may
not seem critical, they at least give the defendant a chance to per-
suade the court by common sense reasoning that no pattern exists
in his case. If Congress or the courts adopt a proposal such as sec-
tion 3575(e),8 4 this opportunity will be lost. The broad provisions
of that proposal will enable the jury to find a pattern without
much difficulty, but as is often the case with hard and fast rules,
once the section 3575(e) requirements are met, the trier of fact will
lose incentive to analyze further the pattern requirement of the
crime.
An example illustrates the problem: A and B are competitors in
the drycleaning business. In 1979, A defrauds B in a contractual
setting. In 1985, A wins $1,000 in an illegal poker game which he
uses to purchase a new machine for his business. Assuming B sues
A on the basis of these predicate acts, the section 3575(e) analysis
would proceed as follows: Similar purposes? Both illegal acts ena-
bled A to improve his business. Same victims? B is injured by both
acts. Similar results? A's business is upgraded each time. Accord-
ing to section 3575(e), a pattern exists in A's action. The jury, hav-
83. E.g., id. Elliott presents an excellent example of the advance planning typical in or-
ganized crime:
J.C.'s [defendant's] modus operandi, as reflected in this arrangement, was
based on the mistaken notion that a person could not be convicted on the basis
of only one co-conspirator's testimony. J.C. thus assumed-and often advised
others-that he would be sheltered from liability if he could deal with only one
other person at each phase of a particular transaction.
Id. at 895 (footnote omitted). Even though the defendant misunderstood the law, this situa-
tion suggests the extent to which professional criminals plan their activities in order to
avoid prosecution.
84. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e).
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ing crossed the section 3575(e) threshold to find a pattern, will
move on to consider the other RICO elements. Yet here is a fact
situation in which a "pattern" of racketeering activity almost cer-
tainly does not exist. Because it only had to meet the cut and dried
section 3575(e) rule, however, the jury is given little discretion to
apply its common sense to the pattern issue. As a result of the new
relatedness element, A would suffer in a way Congress never in-
tended when it enacted RICO.
Defining "pattern" to include a relatedness element is a tricky
business. Some considerations argue for a strict definition that will
lead to consistent results and effective prosecution of professional
racketeers. Others cry for a loose definition that, while emphasiz-
ing the relatedness element, will allow courts to use discretion and
common sense in determining the existence of a pattern. RICO's
ultimate goals will be better served under the second, less-strict
reading.
Rather than adopt the current proposals, Congress or the courts
should adopt a relatedness element under which the predicate acts
must be interrelated in some manner beyond their common rela-
tionship to the enterprise. Although this definition may result in
judicial inconsistency as courts attempt to interpret the clause "in
some manner," it will provide courts with the needed flexibility
with which to apply RICO. This definition emphasizes the need for
an interrelationship between the predicate acts while allowing
courts to consider each fact situation separately. The result will be




The potential relationship among predicate acts constituting an
alleged pattern gives rise to a spectrum of issues. At one end of the
spectrum is the relatedness question: to what extent must the acts
be connected in some manner so as to show a pattern? At the other
end of this spectrum is the continuity question: when are the acts
so closely connected that they are not distinct actions but rather
one activity, and thus incapable of forming a pattern?
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As with the relatedness element, legislative support for a "con-
tinuity" element is unclear from the congressional record. Courts
most often cite the language of the Senate Report stating that it is
a "factor of continuity plus relationship which combines to pro-
duce a pattern."' 5 Other language in the legislative history also im-
plies that some kind of continuity element is inherent in the stat-
ute."' As in the relatedness discussion, however, the lack of
statutory language on the interpretation of "pattern" has resulted
in inconsistent adjudication in the courts on the question of
continuity.
The first case which produced any substantial discussion of the
continuity issue was United States v. Moeller.8 7 In Moeller, the
defendant invested in fire insurance for one of his corporation's
plants. He then arranged for other defendants to burn it down so
that he could obtain the insurance money. The hired men kid-
napped three employees from the plant and set it afire.88 Despite
the fact that the kidnapping and the arson took place almost si-
multaneously, the government asserted that the acts constituted
two acts of racketeering activity and thus formed a pattern."9 The
district court, believing that the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit had already disposed of the continuity issue
in United States v. Parness,90 deferred to that case and held that
the two acts did constitute a pattern."' The judge first asserted a
contrary view in dicta, however:
While the statutory definition makes it clear that a pattern can
consist of only two acts, I would have thought the common sense
interpretation of the word "pattern" implies acts occurring in
different criminal episodes, episodes that are at least somewhat
85. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969). The report also states: "The infiltra-
tion of legitimate business normally requires more than one 'racketeering activity' and the
threat of continuing activity to be effective." Id. (emphasis added).
86. Racketeering activity is "at least two independent offenses forming a pattern of con-
duct." 116 CONG. REc. 35,193 (statement of Rep. Poff); "[RICO] is not aimed at the isolated
offender." Id.
87. 402 F. Supp. 49 (D. Conn. 1975).
88. Id. at 56-57.
89. Id. at 56-58.
90. 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
91. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. at 57-58.
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separated in time and place yet still sufficiently related by pur-
pose to demonstrate a continuity of activity.2
With these words, the court laid the groundwork for the current
continuity arguments.
Despite the language in Moeller, courts declined to acknowledge
any continuity element. In United States v. Weatherspoon,93 for
example, the defendant claimed a lack of continuity to prove that
no pattern existed. in her activities. The defendant had perpetrated
five counts of mail fraud by sending the Veterans Administration
false reports of the enrollment of veterans in her beauty college so
that she could obtain VA benefits. 4 The court noted that "accord-
ing to Weatherspoon, there was only one 'act' of racketeering activ-
ity because all of the mailings which formed the basis for the mail
fraud counts were in furtherance of a single scheme to defraud. '95
Finding her argument "unique," "imaginative," and "novel," the
court nevertheless rejected it because neither the legislative history
nor the plain language of the statute supported her assertion.96
The court concluded that "each mailing in furtherance of a scheme
to defraud is a separate offense. . .even if there is but one scheme
involved. '97
The rule in Weatherspoon carried the day in RICO proceedings,
almost without exception, for several years.9 8 Many of these cases,
like Weatherspoon, involved schemes to defraud which unfolded
over a period of time.99 Some, however, more closely resembled the
facts in Moeller because all of the racketeering acts occurred in a
92. Id. at 57.
93. 581 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1978).
94. Id. at 597-98.
95. Id. at 601.
96. Id. at 601-02.
97. Id. at 602.
98. See, e.g., United States v. Zang, 703 F.2d 1186, 1194 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 828 (1983); United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1038-39 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. de-
nied, 459 U.S. 906, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982); United States v. Starnes, 644 F.2d 673, 678 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 826 (1981); United States v. Beatty, 587 F. Supp. 1325, 1329
(E.D.N.Y. 1984); Beth Israel Medical Center v. Smith, 576 F. Supp. 1061, 1066 (S.D.N.Y.
1983); United States v. Chovanec, 467 F. Supp. 41, 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
99. See, e.g., United States v. Mazzio, 501 F. Supp. 340 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd, 681 F.2d
810 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Salvitti, 451 F. Supp. 195 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
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short time span, such as one night.100 Regardless of the facts,
courts refused to recognize a continuity element in the RICO pat-
tern inquiry.
The Supreme Court passed up a chance to settle the issue in
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.10 The Court did, however, cite the
"continuity plus relationship" language of the Senate Report 0 2
and indicated further that Congress and the courts had failed "to
develop a meaningful concept of 'pattern'. '" 10 3 The Court suggested
a need for a relatedness element, but provided no clue as to the
proper definition of a continuity element. It simply highlighted the
need for judicial reform of "pattern.' ' 0 4
By emphasizing the pattern requirement while refusing to aid in
its interpretation, the Court opened the door for inconsistent adju-
dication of the continuity issue in post-Sedima cases. Recent cases
show that the continuity element remains unsettled in the federal
courts.
Courts have adopted several approaches to the continuity issue.
A few courts have ignored the continuity element by focusing
solely on the issue of relatedness. In those courts which have at-
tempted to establish a continuity element, confusion reigns su-
preme. Much of this judicial confusion derives from varying inter-
pretations of the "different criminal episodes" language in
Moeller.10 5 A narrow view of this phrase has resulted in a require-
ment that the plaintiff prove two entirely separate criminal
schemes. A more moderate reading requires that the plaintiff prove
two episodes within the same scheme. Most post-Sedima cases fall
roughly under one of these two approaches.
100. See, e.g., United States v. Licavoli, 725 F.2d 1040 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1252 (1984) (murder and conspiracy to commit murder were the two predicate acts).
101. 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
102. Id. at 3285 n.14.
103. Id. at 3287.
104. Id.
105. 402 F. Supp 49, 57 (D. Conn. 1975). "Different criminal episodes" is not the only
phrase which has generated confusion. Courts have also set forth varying interpretations of
"transaction." Compare Allington v. Carpenter, 619 F. Supp 474, 478 (C.D. Cal. 1985)
(equating a transation with a single scheme) with Graham v. Slaughter, 624 F. Supp. 222,
225 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (implying that several transactions make up a scheme). The inability to
arrive at a consensus on the meanings of these phrases has led to a rampant misreading of
precedents by these courts.
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Two-schemes approach
The leading case representing the two-schemes approach is
Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare, N.A. v. Inryco, Inc.10 6 In that case,
some of the defendant's employees defrauded the plaintiff by par-
ticipating in a series of kickbacks at the plaintiff's expense. The
RICO suit was based on two mailings involved in one of the kick-
backs. 10 7 The court dismissed the suit because the mailings were
part of the same scheme. l08 The court added that if the other three
kickbacks had involved the use of the mails, the court still would
have found that the mailings constituted one fraudulent scheme,
which does not "represent the necessary 'pattern of racketeering
activity.' ,1o9 The court thus implied that two separate schemes
were required to fulfill the continuity element of the pattern re-
quirement. The court reiterated this interpretation in Morgan v.
Bank of Waukegan,110 where the defendant allegedly participated
in a four-year fraud."' The court held that if all the conspirators
engaged in a "single plot," then despite the number of acts which
took place during the four-year period, no pattern of racketeering
activity existed." 2
The two-schemes approach has generated substantial judicial
support. In Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer,"' the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit endorsed the district court's rea-
soning in Inryco. The defendant in Superior Oil, an employee of
the plaintiff, had been converting gas from the plaintiff's pipe-
line." 4 The court held that "several related acts of mail and wire
fraud in pursuit of the underlying conversion" did not represent
the requisite continuity needed to form a pattern, and thus dis-
106. 615 F. Supp. 828 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
107. Id. at 828-30.
108. Id. at 832.
109. Id.
110. 615 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 838.
113. 785 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1986).
114. Id. at 253-54.
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missed the RICO claim.115 Many courts have followed either Inryco
or Superior Oil in applying the two-schemes approach.116
Two transactions within a single scheme approach
Not all courts have adopted the Inryco two-schemes approach.
Instead, many have endorsed a concept of continuity that requires
two separate transactions, or two separate criminal . episodes,
within a single scheme.
This approach appeared in Graham v. Slaughter.11 7 The defend-
ant in Graham embezzled $60,000 over a two-year period through
twenty payments via the mall and wire services.1 The court
agreed with the conclusion stated in Inryco that multiple mailings
in furtherance of a single criminal episode do not constitute a pat-
tern.1 9 The court determined, however, that:
[w]here this court differs with Inryco is in the implication that a
single fraudulent effort or episode should be equated with a sin-
gle scheme.
115. Id. at 257.
116. See, e.g., Madden v. Gluck, 636 F. Supp. 463, 465 (E.D. Mo. 1986) (fraudulent check
kiting scheme involving multiple acts of mail and wire fraud); Richter v. Sudman, 634 F.
Supp. 234, 237-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (fraudulent misrepresentations made to plaintiffs in or-
der to induce them to attract investors); Utz v. Correa, 631 F. Supp. 592, 594-95 (S.D.N.Y.
1986) (scheme to defraud investor by misappropriation of investor's funds); Allright Mis-
souri, Inc. v. Billeter, 631 F. Supp. 1328, 1329-30 (E.D. Mo. 1986) (multiple acts of wire
fraud in connection with transfer of partnership property); Soper v. Simmons Int'l, Ltd., 632
F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Dunham v. Independence Bank, 629 F. Supp. 983, 989-90
(N.D. IMI. 1986) (prospective borrower brought suit against bank for fraudulent misrepresen-
tations regarding loan); Torwest DBC, Inc. v. Dick, 628 F. Supp. 163, 165-67 (D. Colo. 1986)
(corporate directors secretly purchased property and resold it to corporation at substantial
profit); Medallion TV Enter., Inc. v. SelecTV of California, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 1290, 1295-97
(C.D. Cal. 1986) (defendant fraudulently induced plaintiff to enter into joint venture); SJ
Advanced Technology & Mfg. v. Junkunc, 627 F. Supp. 572, 576-77 (N.D. IlM. 1986) (action
by competitor against government contractor for malicious misrepresentations made to gov-
ernment); Fleet Management Systems, Inc. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 627 F. Supp.
550, 553-60 (C.D. Ill. 1986) (misappropriation of computer software system); Professional
Assets Management, Inc. v. Penn Square Bank, N.A., 616 F. Supp. 1418, 1421-23 (D. Okla.
1985) (fraudulent preparation of audit report by accounting firm); Allington v. Carpenter,
619 F. Supp. 475, 477-78 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (scheme to defraud investors by promising high
rate of return).
117. 624 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. IMI. 1985) (Getzendanner, J.).
118. Id. at 223.
119. Id. at 224-25. See supra text accompanying notes 106-09.
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To be "continuous," more than sporadic or isolated activity
must be alleged. In this court's view, that requires more than a
single transaction but not necessarily more than a single
scheme. 120
The court further illuminated this approach in determining that
predicate acts can form a pattern when they appear to be "inde-
pendently motivated crimes," rather than "ministerial acts per-
formed in the execution of a single fraudulent transaction."''
The judge who authored the opinion in Graham again tried to
delineate the two-transactions approach in Medical Emergency
Service Associates v. Foulke.22 In that case, a medical corporation
accused the defendant physicians of breach of fiduciary duty and
brought a RICO suit based on acts of mail fraud. 2 ' Although
maintaining its earlier reasoning in Graham, the court found that
because each mailing did not result in a "separate injury" or "sepa-
rate transaction," none of the mailings constituted a separate crim-
inal episode. 124 The Graham-Foulke line of reasoning, therefore,
requiring at least two separate criminal episodes within the same
scheme, defines a separate episode as being an "independently mo-
tivated crime," or an act which results in a "separate injury."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
also has followed this approach. In Bank of America National
Trust & Savings Association v. Touche Ross & Co., 25 five banks
brought suit against an accounting firm for the preparation of false
financial statements and reports. The banks relied on these reports
to extend credit to a corporation which later went bankrupt.12 The
court determined that the nine alleged acts of wire and mail fraud
constituted a pattern, stating that "[a]cts that are part of the same
scheme or transaction can qualify as distinct predicate acts."'12 7 In
so holding, the court provided strong support for the two-transac-
120. Id. at 225.
121. Id.
122. 633 F. Supp. 156 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
123. Id. at 157.
124. Id.
125. 782 F.2d 966 (11th Cir. 1986).
126. Id. at 968.
127. Id. at 971.
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tions approach. Many other post-Sedima cases also have relied on
this interpretation. 12
No continuity element approach
At the opposite extreme from the two-schemes approach are
cases in which, despite references to pattern and continuity in
Sedima, courts have required no continuity element at all. Conan
Properties, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc. 2 9 is one such case. Citing some of
the language from footnote 14 of Sedima, the court in Conan
Properties merely concluded that "when two acts which relate to
each other and arise out of the same scheme are alleged, the re-
quirement of pleading a 'pattern of racketeering activity' has been
met."130 Thus, the court interpreted Sedima to mean that "pat-
tern" involved a relatedness element, but not a continuity element.
Other courts have given the language in Sedima a similar
reading.13" '
128. See, e.g., Illinois Dep't of Revenue v. Phillips, 771 F.2d 312, 313 (7th Cir. 1985) (re-
tailer filed fraudulent sales tax returns); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Kerr, 637 F. Supp.
828, 834-35 (W.D.N.C. 1986) (acts of securities, mail, and wire fraud in illegally liquidating
assets of bankrupt corporation); Tryco Trucking Co. v. Belk Stores Serv., Inc., 634 F. Supp.
1327, 1334 (W.D.N.C. 1986) (defendant tried to drive plaintiff out of trucking business by
means of fraud and extortion); Bush Devel. Corp. v. Harbour Place Assoc., 632 F. Supp.
1359, 1364-66 (E.D. Va. 1986) (multiple acts of mail fraud in scheme by general contractor
to defraud construction project owner); Paul S. Mullin & Assoc., Inc. v. Bassett, 632 F.
Supp. 532, 539-41 (D. Del. 1986) (defendants converted decedents business to their own use
and usurped his clients by fraud); United Fish Co. v. Barnes, 627 F. Supp. 732, 734-35 (D.
Me. 1986) (defendants embezzled payments by customers and instructed company to write
off those accounts as bad debts); Rush v. Oppenheimer, 628 F. Supp. 1188, 1198-1200
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (plaintiff brought suit against defendant for "churning" of plaintiff's
stocks); Trak Microcomputer Corp. v. Weame Bros., 628 F. Supp. 1089, (N.D. Il1. 1985)
(several violations of mail and wire fraud as part of scheme to fraudulently obtain
microcomputer technology).
129. 619 F. Supp. 1167 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
130. Id. at 1170.
131. See, e.g., R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350, 1355 (5th Cir. 1985) (hold-
ing that Sedima did not mean that two related acts might not form a pattern, but rather
that two isolated acts would not form a pattern); Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Indus.,
770 F.2d 717, 718 n.1 (8th Cir. 1985) (implying that all that "continuity plus relationship"
requires is a large number of acts and allegation of similar purposes, results, participants,
victims, and methods of commission); Systems Research, Inc. v. Random, Inc., 614 F. Supp.
494, 497 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (holding that the predicate acts merely must be sufficiently related
to constitute a pattern).
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Analysis
RICO is obviously not intended to reach the defendant who has
committed an isolated offense. Courts must therefore define the
point at which multiple acts do or do not constitute such an iso-
lated offense. They should, that is, recognize the need for a con-
tinuity element in the pattern inquiry.
The two-schemes approach set forth in Northern Trust Bank/
O'Hare, N.A. v. Inryco, Inc.13 2 provides a practical solution for lim-
iting Criminal RICO suits to professional criminals. Because only
professional criminals are likely to engage in two separate criminal
schemes, prosecutors and courts will be able to use RICO's harsh
penalties only in the situations for which Congress conceived its
use-the infiltration of legitimate enterprise by organized crime
figures.
The two-schemes approach, however, contains many problems.
First, it may be so restrictive that it limits RICO's availability as a
weapon in the prosecutor's arsenal. The two-schemes approach
coupled with a relatedness element places prosecutors in the im-
practical situation of having to show two completely separate
schemes while showing also that the schemes are related. A profes-
sional criminal could only benefit from a strict combination of both
relatedness and continuity.
Perhaps the biggest problem with the two-schemes approach is
its potentially devastating effect on Civil RICO. Plaintiffs injured
by racketeering are usually the victims of one scheme to defraud,
intimidate, or extort. Under the two-schemes approach, a court
would dismiss the typical Civil RICO suit because the defendant
could show easily that all his acts were part of the same overall
scheme to injure that victim. Perhaps the only way a plaintiff in
this situation could proceed with a Civil RICO suit would be to
allege not only a scheme against him or herself, but also a scheme
against another victim. This claim, however, may run afoul of the
relatedness element. Unless a plaintiff can prove that he was the
victim of two separate schemes by the defendant, therefore, which
is not usually the case in Civil RICO, RICO's private attorney gen-
eral provision would be eviscerated.
132. 615 F. Supp. 828 (N.D. Ill. 1985); see supra text accompanying notes 106-09.
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The two-schemes approach renders RICO useless in some of the
situations in which it is most needed. Congress and the courts,
therefore, should not implement the two-schemes approach.
The two-transactions interpretation is the most workable of the
several approaches. Unlike the no-continuity approach, it reflects
Congress's desire that RICO not be aimed at the isolated offender.
Unlike the two-schemes approach, it does not raise problems of
proof when combined with the relatedness element; both criminal
episodes can occur within a "common scheme or plan." The prob-
lem with this approach, however, is in the difficulty courts have
experienced in defining "separate criminal episodes" or "a single
transaction."
The court in Graham v. Slaughter 33 equated "single transa-
tions" with "independently motivated crimes." 1 4 Asking a court to
determine when two acts are "independently motivated" strains
judicial competence; the court would have to look into the mind of
the defendant to see whether there is any link between his motives
in executing the two acts. Merely by asserting that his acts arose
from the same motive, a defendant can place a heavy burden of
proof on the plaintiff in his attempt to establish the continuity ele-
ment and thus the entire RICO suit. It would be a practically im-
possible burden for either private plaintiffs or prosecutors.
A more helpful analysis appears in Medical Emergency Service
Associates v. Foulke.13 5 In denying the existence of continuity in a
fraud involving several mailings, the court stated that "each mail-
ing did not result in a separate injury or separate transaction. Ac-
cordingly, each mailing is not a separate criminal episode." 136 The
court's implication that each "separate criminal episode" requires
a "separate injury" merits discussion. A court's view of the plain-
tiff's "injury" could have a decided effect on the plaintiff's ability
to meet the continuity element. In a general sense, all of the al-
leged episodes in which the plaintiff is a victim could be viewed as
contributing to his single, total injury. From this broad perspec-
tive, the plaintiff can never prove his case because he only suffers
133. 624 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. IMI. 1985).
134. Id. at 225.
135. 633 F. Supp. 156 (N.D. IIl. 1986).
136. Id. (emphasis added).
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one injury overall, and therefore cannot prove the existence of sep-
arate criminal episodes.
A more narrow understanding of injury, however, improves the
separate criminal episodes approach and provides the courts with
some guidance for adjudicating the continuity element. Courts
should begin their analysis by asking, "Would injury to the victim
still result if this act stood alone, or did the act require the other
predicate offenses in order to complete the injury?" In so asking,
the court must consider each predicate act not as a separate ab-
stract action, but rather within the facts of each case. If the act,
even in that context, would have itself resulted in an injury, then it
likely will constitute a separate criminal episode.
For example, imagine that Victim V receives a phone call from
Racketeer R, in which R fraudulently induces V to send him
money. V then wires R the money, constituting a separate offense
under the wire fraud statute. Two acts have taken place, but is this
one episode or two? Under a properly narrow analysis of the injury
component, a court should find that this is one episode because if
V had not responded to R's call, the first act, by sending money,
the second act, V would have suffered no injury. Because each act
must be linked with the other to create the plaintiff's actual injury,
only one criminal episode exists.
This analysis breaks down, however, in situations such as that
presented in United States v. Moeller,13 7 in which the defendant
committed arson and kidnapping in the same night.138 Under the
foregoing analysis, these acts, each of which caused a separate in-
jury, would satisfy the continuity element. But one night's activity
should hardly constitute truly "separate criminal episodes." Courts
should, therefore, analyze a second factor: a consideration that the
episodes be "somewhat separated in time and place." 3 9 This lan-
guage from Moeller meshes well with the separate injury require-
ment. Because the acts must be "somewhat separated," courts
maintain some discretion in isolating acts that satisfy the separate
injury factor. At the same time, the combination of both factors
137. 402 F. Supp. 49 (D. Conn. 1975).
138. Id. at 57.
139. Id.
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gives courts more guidance than they would have in using just the
"time and place" requirement.
This second factor of the continuity test is not without its flaws.
One spokesman for the United States Attorney General's office,
commenting on the "time and place" language, observed:
[T]he conjunctive 'and' could be read to require that each predi-
cate act be separate from all other acts in both time and place.
Under this interpretation, once an initial criminal act is per-
formed at a certain location, such as defendant's regular place of
business, subsequent predicate acts performed at the same loca-
tion pursuant to an ongoing criminal enterprise could not be
considered as establishing a pattern of racketeering activity. Or,
acts performed simultaneously at separate locations by defend-
ants acting in concert (such as simultaneous acts of murder
against several victims) might not possess the requisite separate-
ness in time, exempting all but one of the acts as RICO
predicates. 140
In order to avoid such problems, courts or lawmakers could change
the conjunctive "and" to "or," thus requiring that the acts be
"somewhat separated by time or place." This will alleviate the
problem of recovery for acts committed in the same place or of acts
occurring simultaneously in different places. By combining the
"separate injury" concept and the "somewhat separated by time or
place" factor, the courts can determine that separate criminal epi-
sodes exist in either case. This analysis will give the courts a work-
able and flexible continuity element.
CONCLUSION
Congress enacted RICO to combat the influences of professional
criminals on ordinary citizens and legitimate business. In con-
structing this statute, Congress was caught in a conflict between
the need for a statute sufficiently broad for effective prosecution,
and one sufficiently limited to restrict its 'application to the in-
tended continuous offenders. This conflict is manifested in the
statute's ambiguous "pattern" requirement. Its very inclusion in
140. See RICO: Hearings on H.R. 2577 and H.R. 2943 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal
Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1985).
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the statute was an attempt to ensure a strict application of RICO,
but the breadth of its definition was a concession to the obvious
need for far-reaching legislation. Although Congress could not have
foreseen it, the sixteen years since RICO's enactment have shown
that, in reality, the hope for a limited application was sacrificed for
the benefits of a broad reach. Courts throughout the country recog-
nize the current need to modify RICO to regain a balance between
these two purposes. Reforming "pattern" by requiring elements of
relatedness and continuity between the predicate acts is the most
effective means of returning RICO to the initial intent of the legis-
lators. The relatedness element should be added simply, without
further definition which would only tend to hollow the term. The
continuity element, on the other hand, requires greater specificity.
Congress and the courts should adopt a two-part analysis, requir-
ing that the predicate acts cause separate injuries and also be
somewhat separated by time or place. By adopting these modifica-
tions, RICO will enable citizens and officials to thwart the effects
of ongoing organized criminal activity on legitimate enterprise,
while preserving individual liberties.
Edward Lee Isler
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